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The main implications of the Q-theory of mergers are tested for United
States and seven continental European countries in both the domestic and
cross-border cases. I ￿nd that European ￿rms, much like those in the United
States, tend to use mergers and acquisitions to make large increases in their
capital stocks, that this choice is more sensitive to the acquirer￿s Tobin￿s Q
than its direct investment, and that mergers raise the eﬃciency of target assets.
Data from cross-border mergers between U.S. acquirers and European targets
support the theory most emphatically.
How to promote technological transfers most eﬀectively within and across coun-
tries, and especially between the United States and the nations of Europe, is a ques-
tion of increasing interest among both academics and policymakers. Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002a, 2002b) show that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a way of
completing such transfers quickly and oﬀer evidence that technological shocks under-
lie most of the merger waves experienced in the U.S. economy over the 20th century.
This paper suggests that the scope of such reallocative activity is worldwide.
The policy implications of placing technology at center stage in motivating M&A
in both the domestic and cross-border cases are simple. If mergers eﬀectively transfer
technologies among frontier sectors and across national borders, and these technolo-
gies enhance productivity and growth, there should be little need to restrict such
transactions. If, on the other hand, M&A is not clearly linked to cross-border tech-
nological transfers, some restrictions on the activity may be warranted. In the latter
case, there may be higher returns to pursuing frameworks that model cross-border
mergers as attempts to exploit established organizational structures with an eye to
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1gaining ￿footholds￿ and ultimately substantial market shares in targeted foreign sec-
tors.
The Q-theory of mergers as formulated by Jovanovic and Rousseau proposes that
the same forces driving ￿rms￿ direct investments also drive their decisions about
merging with other ￿rms, and views mergers in a macroeconomic sense as devices for
solving an economy-wide problem of reallocating capital. Reallocation is needed as
new technologies emerge with the potential to transform fundamentally the ways that
￿rms do business. Readying the existing capital stock (both physical and human) for
use in a new technological climate is less costly if new ￿rms, as they gain experience
with new technologies, are able to acquire older ￿rms while keeping their organization
capital intact. When this happens, the management skills and technological adapt-
ability of the acquirer are passed to the target￿s assets, facilitating their transition
back to the technological frontier.
A key implication is that ￿rms with high values of Tobin￿s Q, and therefore greater
ability to raise the value of target assets, will use acquisitions more intensely than
purchases of more costly new capital. Indeed, using exchange-listed U.S. ￿rms from
Standard and Poor￿s Compustat database for 1970 to 2000, Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002a) ￿nd that M&A investments are more sensitive ￿ by a factor of 2.6 ￿t oT o b i n ￿ s
Q than are direct investments. Since transactions costs (i.e., brokerage, legal, etc.)
associated with M&A are considerable, however, ￿rms must weigh these costs against
the advantages of M&A over direct capital investment. This implies that high-Q
￿rms, being the ones with the best technologies, seek proportionate increases in their
capital stocks that are large enough to overcome the transactions costs associated
with mergers, and again the U.S. data bear this out.
At the same time, the United States arguably has the world￿s most developed
capital markets ￿ venues where the battle for corporate control is increasingly waged.
It is also among the world￿s technological leaders, which when combined with an
active stock market makes for an environment that is particularly conducive to the
domestic transfer of technologies. To the extent that high Q￿s are associated with such
leadership and innovation, it is therefore not surprising to observe ￿rms with high
Q￿s merging with lower Q partners in the U.S. data. Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord
(2001), for example, report that in more than two-thirds of all mergers since 1973, the
acquirer￿s Q exceeded the target￿s Q.A n d S e r v a e s ( 1991) ￿nds that total takeover
returns (de￿ned as the abnormal increase in the combined values of the merging
parties) are larger when the target has a low Q and if the bidder had a high Q.T h e
question posed here is whether such a mechanism also operates domestically within
the major continental European economies, and whether such technology transfers
appear to be central to cross-border mergers as well.
The paper begins with a review of the key features of the Q-theory of mergers.
Next I describe the data used to extend the empirical investigation of the theory
to the domestic and cross-border cases of the United States and a set of European
2countries. I then present evidence that acquisitions remain a preferred mechanism of
reallocation for high-Q ￿rms in the cross-border context.
1. Theoretical Overview
There is a close parallel between the Q-theory of mergers and the Q-theory of
standard investment, but with one key diﬀerence: where the standard Q-theory holds
that a ￿rm￿s direct investment depends on its own Q,t h eQ-theory of mergers holds
that a ￿rm￿s M&A activity depends on the diﬀerence between its Q and the Q￿s of its
potential targets. Denoting the latter by q, this section will show that, while direct
investment is a function Q, acquisitions are a function of Q−q.T h er e m a i n i n gs e c t i o n s
will subject these restrictions to tests with U.S. and European data on domestic
and cross-border mergers. Following the partial equilibrium framework developed in
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a),1 output is given by
output = zK, (1)
where z is the ￿rm￿s technology and K is its capital stock, both physical and human.
Of course, z could stand not just for technology, but generally for the quality of
organization capital (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001), the quality of other intangibles
such as proprietary inventions (Czarnitzki, Hall and Oriani, 2005), or simply its
management skill (Lucas, 1978). In any case, the ￿rm-speci￿c shock follows the
Markov process
Pr{zt+1 ≤ z
0 | zt = z} = F (z
0,z). (2)
The ￿rm must accept whatever draw of z that nature endows it with each period.
Firms can buy new capital at a price of unity, but an exiting ￿rm can disassemble its
capital and recover a salvage value of s per unit or can sell it in the M&A market at
a common price of q per unit. The price of new capital is normalized to unity, and it
is thus assumed that s<1. To have both the salvage and M&A markets open, it is
necessary to assume that q = s.
The capital stock evolves as
K
0 =( 1− δ)K + X + Y, (3)
where X is the ￿rm￿s direct investment in capital and Y is its acquisitions of bundled
capital. The ￿rm also faces the following cost of raising its capacity:
C (x,y)K, where x =
X
K




1See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002b) for a general equilibrium exposition of the Q-theory of
mergers.
3Like the production function, the adjustment cost is homogeneous of degree one in
K, X,a n dY .
The ￿rm transfers its eﬃciency, z,t oall new and used capital that it buys.2 The
largest joint gains to a merger occur when the target is ineﬃcient and the bidder is
eﬃcient. Because returns to scale in production and growth are constant, the return
to capital does not depend on the ￿rm￿s size, K, but only on its eﬃciency, z.P r o ￿t
per unit of capital is z − C (x,y) − x − qy,a n dt h e￿rm￿s value per unit of capital is
Q(z)= m a x
x≥0,y≥0
{z − C (x,y) − x − qy +( 1− δ + x + y)Q
∗ (z)}, (5)
where Q∗ (z) is the ￿rm￿s discounted expected present value of capital tomorrow given









This expression re￿ects the ￿rm￿s option of selling its capital in the next period on
the merger market at a price of q dollars per unit.
At an interior maximum, the optimal x and y would satisfy the ￿rst order condi-
tions
c1 (x,y)=Q
∗ − 1. (7)
and
c2 (x,y)=Q
∗ − q. (8)
The only ￿rm-speci￿c variable in these conditions is Q∗ = Q∗ (z). If z is positively
autocorrelated, then Q∗ is increasing in z, and more productive ￿rms will grow faster
and use both margins, x and y, to achieve that growth. Neither the ￿rm￿s x,n o ri t s
y, nor its survival depends on ￿rm size, K, after controlling for Q∗. Thus, a large
￿rm grows as easily as a small one; no optimal ￿rm size exists, just optimal growth.
The model implies y =0for low-Q∗ ￿rms if there is a ￿xed cost, φ,o fa c q u i r i n g




c(x,0) if y =0 .
This is cost incurred per unit of K, and therefore returns to scale remain constant.
Let i = x + y be the gross investment rate in eﬃciency units. A low-i ￿rm will then
want to avoid the cost φ and will set y =0 , whereas a high-i ￿rm will use both
2There is considerable evidence for U.S. ￿rms that mergers raise the productivity of targets￿
plants (McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995; Schoar, 2002) and there is reason to expect that the same
would be true in cross-border mergers. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001), and Harris, Siegel and Wright (2005) also oﬀer evidence that ￿rm productivity rises after a
merger.
4margins. The value of i,c a l li ti∗,a tw h i c ht h e￿rm is indiﬀerent between buying in
the acquisitions market and staying out of it, solves for i the equation
i + c(i,0) = φ +m i n
y
{(i − y)+qy + c(i − y,y)}. (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is lower when i is small, and the right-hand side is lower
when i is high. Of course, i itself depends on the ￿rm￿s z.
Firms may either exit and disassemble their capital, or they may be acquired.
Either way, they get q<1 per unit of capital. Let ze be the point at which the ￿rm
is indiﬀerent between staying in business and exiting:
Q(ze)=q.
Imagine a steady state in which the distribution of Q(z) replicates itself period
after period, roughly as in Hopenhayn (1992). Each period, ￿rms with z￿s below
ze dissolve or are acquired. For higher levels of z (and thus higher levels of Q),
￿rms make only direct investments because the ￿xed costs of M&A deter them from
entering that market, while at still higher levels of Q(z) ￿rms both invest directly
and acquire capital through mergers. Beyond the critical productivity level z∗ (the
value of z corresponding to i∗ a n di m p l y i n ge v e nh i g h e rl e v e l so fQ)t h e ya l s oi n v e s t
in acquisitions y,a n da f t e rz reaches the ￿overtaking￿ level zO, acquisitions outpace
direct investments.
Fig. 1 depicts how investment in x and y varies with the size of the total in-
vestment, i,with the schedules for x and y adding up to the 45o line. At the critical
investment rate i∗, x suddenly drops from i∗ to x∗,a n dy jumps from zero to ymin
Thereafter, y is the more elastic of the two modes of investment (i.e., the ￿gure is
drawn on the assumption that cy is small relative to cx). When the investment rate
reaches iO, y overtakes x because of the lower marginal adjustment cost that the
accumulation of y i sa s s u m e dt oi m p o s eo nt h e￿rm at high levels of investment.
2. Evidence
In this section I present evidence on the Q-theory of mergers for the United States
and seven key continental European nations in both the domestic and cross-border
cases. Data are from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson￿s International
Mergers and Acquisitions database and cover the period from 1994 to the end of April
2005. To be included in the analysis, the available data for each acquirer transaction
must allow for the computation of Tobin￿s Q and the ratios of capital expenditures and
merger values to the ￿rm￿s total assets. This limits the number of observations since
many M&A transactions in the SDC database do not contain information other than
the names and nations of the acquirers and targets. Even so, there is adequate data













Figure 1: The Point of Overtaking, iO
for more than 7,900 domestic and 1,700 cross-border acquirers for the United States.
There were fewer mergers involving the seven continental European nations that I will
usually consider (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland), with only 367 domestic and 561 cross-border acquisitions represented
o v e rt h es a m et i m ep e r i o d . 3
2.1.D o￿rms making large capital stock adjustments choose M&A?
The ￿rst implication of the Q-theory considered is whether ￿rms making large
adjustments to their capital stocks prefer M&A to standard expenditures on new and
used capital. In other words, do capital stock adjustments both within and across
countries conform roughly with the pattern in Fig. 1?
3All of these countries are part of the Eurozone with the exception of Switzerland, which I
include in the analysis because of its important position in the European capital markets. The
other countries were chosen based on the amount of merger activity recorded for them in the SDC
database.
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Figure 2: Direct Capital Purchases, x, and Acquired Capital, y,b yI n v e s t m e n tR a t i o ,
i = x + y, United States 1994-2005
Fig. 2 is the empirical counterpart to Fig. 1 for the United States. The size
of the expansion, i, is given on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis plots the
HP-￿ltered means of x and y for ￿r m st h a tf a l lw i t h i ne a c hp e r c e n t a g ep o i n to ft h e
range of i.4 Panel (a), which considers domestic M&A only, shows turning points that
are not as sharp as those suggested by the model, though standard investment does
dominate M&A for smaller adjustments of the capital stock (i.e., when i < io). The
point of overtaking occurs at i =0 .16, or when the adjustments involve increasing
the stock of capital by about 16p e r c e n t .
The point of overtaking is lower than that found by Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002a) for U.S. domestic mergers in 1998, which was about 50 percent. There are
at least two possible reasons for this. First, io has been falling rapidly over time,
presumably due to U.S. stock market development and innovation, so that the values
obtained for 1994 to 2005 could well be realizations of a process with a downward
trend.5 Second, the SDC database includes ￿rms that have had at least one merger
4Fig. 2 pools 7,951 observations from 1994-2005 in panel (a), and 1,716 observations from the
same years in panel (b). Since the sample gets thinner as i∗ gets large, the ￿gure shows only
adjustments from 1 to 50 percent. I use a ￿rm￿s average total assets over the 12 months preceding
its merger (SDC data item TASS) to proxy for K. Merger value, Y , is the recorded value of the
transaction in either stock or cash (SDC data item VAL), while investment, X,i sg i v e nb yt o t a l
capital expenditure over the past 12m o n t h s( S D Cd a t ai t e mA C A P E X ) .W h e na￿rm records
multiple mergers in a given year, all are combined when generating a single y observation for that
￿rm-year. I linearly interpolate between occasional missing percentage points in the range of i∗
before applying the H-P ￿lter.
5Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a, p. 201)r e p o r ta nio of 1.12f o rt h e1971-2000 period, but also
note that it had fallen from 1.43 in 1980 to 1.09 in 1989 before reaching 0.5 in 1998.





























Figure 3: Direct Capital Purchases, x, and Acquired Capital, y,b yI n v e s t m e n tR a t i o ,
i = x + y, Seven European Nations 1998-2005
in a given year, meaning that all ￿rms re￿e c t e di np a n e l( a )o fF i g . 2a r ea l r e a d y
on the segment of the cost function C(x,y) for which y>0 and have thus absorbed
the costs of entering the merger market for at least a portion of their investment. In
other words, panel (a) re￿ects only that part of Fig. 1 that is to the right of i∗.T h i s
diﬀers from Fig. 5 of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a, p. 201), which by using all
exchange-listed ￿rms in the Compustat database, including those that did not have
a merger, re￿ects the full range of Fig. 1. Since the theory assumes a proportional
￿xed cost of entry to the merger market, meaning that there are no scale economies
associated with being an acquirer, io should be unaﬀected by this diﬀerence in the
sample, yet the data in Fig. 2 indicate a lower io.T h i s m a y r e ￿ect the presence
of umodeled scale economies associated with having already gained experience as an
acquirer and forming the requisite brokerage and legal relationships needed to act
eﬃciently on the merger market.
Panel (b) of Fig. 2 shows that the overtaking point for U.S. cross-border M&A
occurs at about 25 percent, considerably higher than that observed for domestic
mergers. This may re￿ect higher costs associated with cross-border mergers, perhaps
involving the processing of information about the prospects of various non-domestic
targets. At the same time, the ￿rst implication of the Q-theory is con￿rmed ￿ ￿rms
prefer mergers to direct investment for larger adjustments of their capital stocks.
Fig. 3 shows the overtaking point for a group of seven continental European
countries with active merger markets.6 Panel (a) shows that domestic M&A activity
6In Fig. 3, data from 367 ￿rms were used to construct panel (a), while panel (b) used observations
from 561 ￿r m s .T h ec o v e r a g eb e g i n si n1998 because this is when the SDC begins to have adequate
8(de￿ned as transactions within individual European countries) begins to dominate
direct investment at the same adjustment size (i.e., about 16 percent) found for the
United States. The overtaking point for cross-border M&A, shown in panel (b),
is higher than iO for domestic transactions, but is also lower for this selection of
European countries than for the United States. This may re￿e c tM & Ac o s t st h a ta r e
generally lower for European acquirers, but more likely large gains to the transfer
of technologies in the Eurozone. In light of this ￿nding, it is even reasonable to ask
why there is so little domestic and cross-border merger activity in these countries
compared to that in the United States.7
2.2. Are M&A transactions more responsive to Q−q than direct investment is to Q?
In this section I take an OLS regression approach to determining the sensitivity
of both types of investment to the level of the acquirer￿s Tobin￿s Q. Recalling (7) and
(8), a ￿rm￿s x and y depend only on its Q∗. There are thus functions of one variable
f and g such that x = f (Q∗), and y = g (Q∗ − q). If c(x,y) is additively separable,
q enters g,b u tn o tf. Linearizing (7) and (8), a set of regressions emerges with the


















1 (Qj,t−1 − ﬂ qt−1)+α
y
2t,
where t is a set of year dummies with αx
2 and α
y
2 vectors of coeﬃcients on them. The
model predicts that αx
1 and α
y
1 should be positive. Table 1 presents regression results
for U.S. ￿rms that engaged in domestic mergers between 1994 and 2005, and a set of
European ￿rms that engaged in domestic mergers between 1998 and 2005. The unit
of observation is a ￿rm-year. The market-to-book ratio of a ￿rm￿s ￿nancial liabilities
serves as a proxy for Q.8 ﬂ q is given by the average Q in each year of target ￿rms in
each subgroup.
The results for U.S. investment (left panel of Table 1) are consistent with the
Q-theory. Direct investment by acquirers (i.e., the xj) responds to their respective
data on European acquirers and targets to compute the investment rates plotted in the ￿gure.
7For example, the European Commission launched a study in April 2005 aimed at determining
the obstacles to cross-border merger activity in the ￿nancial sector of the European Union. The
study was motivated by the widespread belief that ￿nancial integration across EU nations would be
bene￿cial, and the presumption that regulatory burdens imposed by various European governments
presented the most severe obstacles.
8To compute market values from the SDC ￿les, I start with the value of common equity at share
prices four weeks prior to the merger, and then add in the book value of preferred stock and short
and long-term debt. Book values are computed similarly, but use the book value of common equity
rather than the market value.
9Table 1
Q−Regressions for Domestic Investment
United States 7 European Countries
100xj,t 100xj,t 100yj,t 100yj,t 100xj,t 100xj,t 100yj,t 100yj,t
Qj,t−1 0.122 0.123 0.116 -0.75
(3.94) (4.20) (0.76) (0.44)
Qj,t−1 − ﬂ qt−1 5.343 4.443 2.1160 . 6 2 6
(3.94) (3.12) (2.40) (0.72)
industry no yes no yes no yes no yes
eﬀects
R2 .01 .20 .01 .10. 0 2 . 2 3 . 14. 5 5
N 7951 7951 5402 5402 367 367 169 169
Note: The table presents estimates for Eq. 10 with t-statistics in parentheses.
The dependent variable for each regression appears in the column heading. The
regressions for the 7 European countries include dummy variables for each country,
and all regressions include yearly dummy variables (not reported).
Qsw i t hc o e ﬃcients that are statistically signi￿cant at the one percent level, whether
dummy variables for two-digit Standard Industry Classi￿cation (SIC) codes are in-
cluded in the regression or not. The proportionate capital stock adjustments executed
through mergers (i.e., the yj) are even more responsive, as the theory implies, with
the coeﬃcients on Qj − ﬂ q about forty times larger than those on Qj.T h i sd i ﬀerence
is greater than Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) found for Compustat ￿rms over the
1971-2000 period, with the coeﬃcients on Qj − ﬂ q itself more than twice as large and
the coeﬃcients on Qj about six times smaller than they found. These diﬀerences
probably arise for the same reasons that the overtaking point in Fig. 2(a) was lower
with the SDC sample.
For the seven European countries, the response of direct investment to Q among
￿rms that are already participants in the domestic merger market is not statistically
signi￿cant. The size of M&A adjustments also appears unaﬀected by Qj − ﬂ q when
dummies for SIC codes are included in the regression, but the coeﬃcient is signi￿cant
at the ￿ve percent level when the SIC codes are omitted. This suggests that while
there is some evidence in favor of the Q-theory of mergers for domestic M&A activity
within Eurozone countries, unmodeled industry-speci￿c forces might also explain why
high-Q ￿rms prefer mergers over direct investments.
102.3. Are M&A transactions driven mainly by excess cash of the acquirer?
A ￿r m ￿ sm a n a g e rm a ys o m e t i m e sb ea b l et op u r s u eh i so w no b j e c t i v e s￿t h es i z e
of his ￿rm, for example ￿ at the expense of shareholders￿ wealth. Jensen (1986)
argues that managers of ￿rms with excess cash are more likely to apply that cash
towards acquisitions than return it to shareholders in the form of dividends, even
if an acquisition may have a negative net present value. The purchase of new and
disassembled used-capital does not expand the span of control as widely as a merger
might, and thus free cash is also more likely to go towards wasteful acquisitions than
internal growth.
Table 2
Q−Regressions for Domestic Investment with Cash
United States 7 European Countries
100xj,t 100xj,t 100yj,t 100yj,t 100xj,t 100xj,t 100yj,t 100yj,t
Qj,t−1 0.124 0.121 0.111 -0.066
(3.94) (4.08) (0.71) (0.39)
Qj,t−1 − ﬂ qt−1 4.147 3.604 2.223 0.664
(3.02) (2.52) (2.51) (0.77)
casht−1 -0.004 0.009 3.337 3.240 0.006 -0.030 -0.298 -0.338
(0.23) (0.58) (5.16) (4.72) (0.14) (0.67) (1.03) (1.13)
industry no yes no yes no yes no yes
eﬀects
R2 .01 .20 .01 .02 .02 .23 .15. 5 6
N 7951 7951 5402 5402 367 367 169 169
See note to Table 1.
The regressions in Table 2 address the question of whether excess cash is directed
towards mergers rather than dividends by adding cash balances (SDC data item
ACASH, including cash and marketable temporary investment vehicles) normalized
by total assets to the baseline speci￿cations described in (10). Again the focus is on
domestic M&A activity. Cash has virtually no eﬀect on x for either U.S. or European
￿rms, but has a positive eﬀect on y for U.S. acquirers that is signi￿cant at the ￿ve
percent level. That is, when a U.S. manager has extra money to invest, he spends
11it on acquisitions and not on direct capital purchases. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient
on cash balances is not statistically signi￿cant for ￿r m si nt h es e v e nc o n t i n e n t a l
European countries. It thus appears that European ￿rms are less interested in or
more constrained in their ability to expand their span of control through M&A than
U.S. ￿r m s .A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ec o e ﬃcients on Qj and Qj − ﬂ q are for the most part
unaﬀected by the inclusion of cash balances for either group.
2.4. Do Q − q and excess cash drive cross-border M&A?
Table 3 reports results from the y equation for cross-border mergers. In contrast
to the domestic regressions in Tables 1 and 2, the coeﬃcients on Qj−ﬂ q are statistically
signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level or less in all cases. The coeﬃcients on Qj − ﬂ q are
smaller, however, for U.S. cross-border mergers than they were for domestic mergers.
This once again probably re￿ects the higher information and brokerage costs that U.S.
￿rms face in pursuing cross-border M&A. There is also some evidence that U.S. ￿rms
use excess cash to fund cross-border M&A as readily as it funds domestic mergers
this way.
Table 3
Q−Regressions for Cross-Border Mergers
Dependent variable: 100yj,t
United States 7 European Countries
Qj,t−1 − ﬂ qt−1 1.278 1.190 1.164 1.125 2.011 1.7182 . 0 6 71.667
(3.90) (3.44) (3.52) (3.23) (2.63) (2.51) (2.65) (2.39)
casht−1 0.314 0.246 -0.065 0.078
(2.30) (1.66) (0.38) (0.43)
industry no yes no yes no yes no yes
eﬀects
R2 .02 .06 .02 .07 .06 .51 .06 .56
N 948 948 948 948 223 223 2.23 223
See note for Table 1.
What is most striking about Table 3, however, is that the coeﬃcients for the
European cross-border acquirers are larger than those for U.S. cross-border mergers.
12Table 4
Q−Regressions Restricted to U.S. Acquirers and European Target Pairs
Dependent variable: 100yj,t
Qj,t−1 − ﬂ qt−1 6.052 5.788 5.985 5.748
(6.18) (5.09) (6.12) (5.05)
casht−1 0.342 0.293
(1.30) (0.97)
industry no yes no yes
eﬀects
R2 .19. 2 3. 2 0 . 0 7
N 196 196 196 196
S e en o t ef o rT a b l e1.
This opens the possibility that M&A activity, operating through the Q-theory, has
promoted the transfer of technologies among countries in the Eurozone and beyond.
Table 4 presents results from the y equation for U.S. acquirers and European
targets with an eye to determining more speci￿cally whether technology transfer
from the United States to Europe is accomplished through cross-border mergers. In
this case, I use the ﬂ q￿s from targets of European domestic mergers as a proxy for q.
The responses of M&A investment to Q − q are consistently positive and signi￿cant
at the one percent level, and are even larger than those obtained for U.S. domestic
mergers. Unlike the domestic and overall cross-border results, however, U.S. ￿rms do
not appear to waste cash on acquiring European ￿rms. Perhaps this is because the
potential for eﬃciency gains in European targets is so high.
2.5. Do acquiring ￿rms have higher Q￿s than target ￿rms?
The ￿nal implication of the Q-theory of mergers considered here is perhaps the
most basic, namely that the Q-values of acquiring ￿rms on average exceed those of
targets. Though the SDC generally have less data for targets than acquirers that
would enable the computation of Tobin￿s Q, a preliminary investigation is still possi-
ble.
The left panel in Table 5 shows the unconditional means of acquirer and target Q-
values for M&A involving U.S. and European acquirers and their domestic and foreign
targets. There are many more observations available to compute these summary
13Table 5
Comparison of Acquirer and Target Q￿s
unmatched matched
Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acq. > Target
U.S. domestic 3.10 2.74 3.42 2.28 70.8%
(13,135) (2,648) (1,229) (1,229)
U.S. cross-border 2.96 2.62 3.50 2.25 70.2%
(2,421) (347) (178) (178)
7E u r o p e a n 2 . 14 1.72 1.78 1.75 54.9%
domestic (573) (178) (51)( 5 1)
7 European 2.56 2.54 3.51 2.59 53.8%
cross-border (639) (164) (65) (65)
Note: The table presents average values of Tobin￿s Q for acquirers and targets in
the SDC sample, with the number of ￿rms used to compute each average in
parentheses.
statistics than were available for the regression analyses of Sections 2.2 - 2.4 because
several other objects (i.e., direct investment, merger values, cash balances, and total
assets) are not needed to simply calculate Q. The acquirers and targets represented
in the left panel are also unmatched, which admits the largest possible number of
observations. For U.S. mergers, acquirer Q-values on average exceed those of targets
in both the domestic and cross-border subsets, and though the ￿ndings are not as
striking for the European countries, the ￿ndings remain consistent with the Q-theory.
The right panel of Table 5 presents unconditional means of acquirer and target
Q-values drawn from transactions in which the Q of both counterparties are known.
This restricts the number of observations available even more than the regression
analysis, since the latter does not require that the targets￿ Qs be known. At the
same time, focusing on matched pairs of merging entities allows the implication of
technology transfer through Q to be more directly investigated through the statistic
provided in the ￿nal column of the Table 5, i.e., the percentage of cases where the
acquirer￿s Q exceeds that of the target.
With the matched M&A transactions, the dominance of acquirer Q-values over
those of targets is even more pronounced for U.S. ￿rms than in the unmatched analy-
sis, with the Q of the acquirer exceeding that of the targets over seventy percent of
t h et i m ei nb o t ht h ed o m e s t i ca n dc r o s s - b o r d e rc a s e s .T h e s e￿gures are slightly larger
than those obtained by Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) for U.S. mergers from
141973 to 1999, and suggest that the Q-based motivation for mergers may be more
applicable now than ever. Acquirer Q-values exceed those of targets more often than
not for the seven European countries in the sample, but the ￿ndings in this much
smaller sample are not as emphatic as those obtained for the United States.
3. Conclusion
The Q-theory of mergers oﬀers a framework for understanding M&A activity that
operates through fundamentals and in a neoclassical context. It also generates clear
implications for empirical testing. The tests executed here demonstrate that: 1) ￿rms
prefer M&A to standard investment when making large adjustments to their capital
stocks; 2) large adjustments through M&A are more likely to occur for high-Q ￿rms;
3) ￿rms with excess cash on their balance sheets seem more likely to become acquirers;
4) acquirer Q-values exceed those of targets more often than not; and 5) these results
extend beyond the domestic M&A market in the United States, applying as well to
domestic and cross-border mergers among a set of seven European countries.
Perhaps most striking, however, is the con￿rmation of the theory for cross-border
mergers between U.S. acquirers and European targets. Indeed, U.S. ￿rms with high
Q-values seem quite willing to search for targets in Europe with which to execute large
increases in their capital stocks. At the same time, there is less cross-border merger
activity between the United States and continental Europe than there is between the
United States and other areas of the world. If, as the evidence indicates, the Q-theory
of mergers does operate for cross-border mergers as readily as for U.S. domestic M&A
and mergers with U.S. ￿rms seem to be a viable mechanism for transferring technolo-
gies to countries in the Eurozone, the minimization of obstacles to such transactions
would seem to deserve a place at the forefront of current discussions on European
corporate policy.
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